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Amendment: Is the Jury Out?* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The role of juries in deciding patent suits has grown dramatically in 
recent times. In the late 1960s to early 1970s, juries decided patent 
disputes in less than ten percent of cases. 1 By contrast, in the 1990s, 
the percentage of patent jury trials now exceeds fifty percent. 2 Many 
observers believe that the increase in patent cases tried before juries is 
related to the increase in verdict awards from patent litigation.3 Not 
surprisingly, the effect of jury outcomes in patent disputes is a hotly 
debated issue among the business community, academics, and practitio-
ners. Emerging from the debate are charges of jury bias4 and jury 
difficulty in understanding complex patent and high technology law.5 
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I. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 336 
n.30 (1971) (reporting that 13 of 382 patent suits were decided by juries in the period 
1968-1970). 
2. See, e.g., In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (percentage 
of jury trials was about 60% from 1992-1994 and reached 70% in 1994). 
3. Stephen B. Judlowe & Lee A. Goldberg, Jury Trials, 397 PLIIPAT 173, 173 
(1994); see also Timothy L. Swabb, Federal Circuit Cannot Stop Runaway Jury Awards 
in Patent Suits, 3 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: PAT. 11 (1995) [hereinafter Swabb]. 
4. Lay juries may be inherently biased towards the patentee because they hold the 
U.S. Patent Office in high regard. Swabb, supra note 3, at 176. Jury bias may also be 
evident in the preference of awards to independent inventors challenging large 
corporations or foreign corporations. Id. See also Daniel Akst, The Cutting Edge: 
Computing/Technology/Innovation INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES Patent Suit Jury 
Trials are the Rage, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at 8. 
5. Juries may be too easily swayed by tangential issues because they are unable 
to properly understand the complex technologies of today's patents. See Swabb, supra 
note 3, at 177; see also Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate 
Review of Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 623 n.4 (1996); 
Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA 77 (1994). 
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In light of such concerns, many practitioners advocate reducing or 
abolishing the role of juries in patent cases. 6 
The role of the jury in patent trials has remained unclear after a series 
of recent court decisions. The constitutional question at issue in these 
decisions was whether the Seventh Amendment barred the elimination 
of juries from deciding specific issues in patent cases. The actions 
challenging the Seventh Amendment involve: (1) patent claims, (2) the 
doctrine of equivalents, and (3) patent invalidity. 
Concerning the issue of patent claims, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), sitting en bane, brushed aside 
concerns about Seventh Amendment rights in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments Inc. 7 when it precluded juries from deciding the interpreta-
tion and scope of patent claims, the portion of the patent that expressly 
defines the metes and bounds of a patentee's property interest in an 
invention. 
For the doctrine of equivalents,8 the Federal Circuit in Hilton-Davis 
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkensen Co.,9 again sitting en bane, by a 
narrow margin upheld the doctrine and the right under the Seventh 
Amendment to have a jury apply the doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, reversed and remanded Hilton-Davis without discussing the 
Seventh Amendment issue because the court deemed it unnecessary to 
decide the case. 10 
Finally, patent invalidity is a defense commonly raised in actions for 
patent infringement when the defending alleged infringer asserts the 
patent either is invalid or he or she is not liable for infringement. 11 
The right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment for the question of 
patent invalidity is a hotly contested issue within the Federal Circuit that 
6. See, e.g., Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA 77 (1994); 
Kenneth R. Adamo, Reforming Jury Practice in Patent Cases: Suggestions Towards 
Leaming to Love Using an Eighteenth Century System While Approaching the Twenty 
First Century, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 345 (1996). 
7. Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 
116 S.Ct. 1834 (1996). 
8. The doctrine of equivalents is a critical area of patent infringement litigation. 
Under the doctrine, a patentee attempts to expand the literal scope of the patent claims 
to include "equivalents" of the claimed invention. See, e.g., 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04 (1997). 
9. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkensen Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (Federal Circuit in a narrow 7 to 6 ruling upheld the right of jury trial to 
patent infringement suit for evaluating the doctrine of equivalents). 
10. Wamer-Jenkensen Co. v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 117 S.Ct. 1040, 1053 n.8 
(1997). A unanimous court appeared to favor the jury role although it did not directly 
address the issue ("Nothing in our recent Markman decision necessitates a different 
result than that reached by the Federal Circuit."). Id. 
11. See infra Part II.A. 
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has yet to be resolved by the court en bane. The Federal Circuit in 
panel decisions recently faced the Seventh Amendment question of 
patent invalidity in In re Lockwood12 and in In re SGS-Thomson 
Microelectronics Inc.,13 which was decided based on the court's 
holding in Lockwood.14 In both· cases, a district court denied the 
plaintiff's demand to have a jury decide the patent invalidity claim, and 
in both cases the Federal Circuit granted the plaintiff's request for a writ 
of mandamus to have a jury try the invalidity claim. Also, in both 
cases, the Federal Circuit declined a request by the defendant for an en 
bane suggestion to rehear the writ. 15 
In Lockwood, three members of the Federal Circuit, led by Circuit 
Judge Nies, filed a vigorous dissent that attacked the panel's decision on 
its interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. 16 The defendant in 
Lockwood sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court, 
without explanation, vacated the Federal Circuit's decision granting the 
writ of mandamus to Lockwood and remanded the case to the district 
court with instructions to proceed.17 
After vacating the decision in Lockwood, the Supreme Court denied 
a petition for writ of certiorari by the ddefendant in SGS-Thomson, 
appealing from the Federal Circuit decision to grant a writ of mandamus 
for a jury trial to hear the patent invalidity action. 18 The denial of 
request for certiorari may indicate the Supreme Court's satisfaction with 
the Federal Circuit's apparent majority view favoring the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in patent invalidity actions. The 
Supreme Court's order to vacate the decision in Lockwood necessarily 
eliminates the precedential value of a jury trial right for patent invalidity, 
12. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see infra Part III for additional 
details of the case. 
13. In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, 60 F.3d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See infra 
Part III for additional details of the case. 
14. SGS-Thomson, 60 F.3d at 839. 
15. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 981; In re SGS-Thomson, 60 F.3d at 862. 
16. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 981 (Nies J., dissenting); see also infra note 23. 
17. American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995). See also infra 
note 58 and accompanying text, which suggest that the Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment because Lockwood withdrew his demand for a jury trial. 
18. International Rectifier v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, 116 S. Ct. 336 
(1995) (denying certiorari). 
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provided by the Federal Circuit's decisions in Lockwood and in SGS-
Thomson.19 
Thus, the issue of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in 
patent invalidity actions remains unsettled and continues to raise 
confusion at the district court level. 20 With public pressure rising 
against jury verdicts, the split in the Federal Circuit and the silence of 
the Supreme Court on the Seventh Amendment right in patent invalidity 
actions will continue to fuel the public concern about this important 
constitutional issue. 
This Comment examines the constitutional issues surrounding the 
Seventh Amendment right to. a jury trial on the subject of patent 
invalidity. Part II of the Comment presents background information 
about patent validity, infringement, and declaratory relief actions 
necessary to fully appreciate the procedural issues in patent actions that 
affect a Seventh Amendment analysis. Part III presents a detailed 
discussion of the procedural issues in Lockwood and in SGS-Thomson 
vis-a-vis patent rights in jury trials. Parts IV and V analyze the Seventh 
Amendment issues raised in Judge Nies's. dissent in Lockwood.21 
Specifically, Part IV evaluates· the Seventh aAmendment historical test 
and applies it to a declaratory judgement of patent invalidity. Part V 
discusses a jury trial right to patent invalidity in view of two known 
exceptions to the Seventh Amendment: the public rights exception and 
the matter of law exception. Finally, this Comment concludes that an 
action for patent invalidity should not be afforded a jury trial right under 
the Seventh Amendment because the action is arguably equitable rather 
19. Decisions that have been .vacated and remanded for further proceedings 
normally carry no precedential value. See County of Los Angles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 
634 n.6 (1979) (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 442 U.S. 563, 578 n.12 ("Of necessity 
our decision 'vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court's 
opinion of precedential effect .... "')); Fleet Aerospace v. Holderman, 848 F.2d 720, 
722 (1988); but see William N. Hulsey III et al., Recent Developments in Patent Law, 
4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 99, 114 (1995) (suggesting the Supreme Court order to vacate 
the Lockwood judgement might constitute an implicit reversal of the Federal Circuit's 
judgment). 
20. See Hoechst Marion Roussel v. Par Pharmaceutical, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1363, 1367 (D.N.J. 1996) (unpublished opinion; in granting certification for appeal under 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the court reasoned that "a controlling question of law exists over 
whether a jury trial is available on issues of noninfringement and invalidity."). 
21. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 at 981 (Nies J., dissenting). The dissent asserted 
that (1) patents are public rights and as such, are exempted from the Seventh 
Amendment; (2) the historical test conclusion that a declaratory judgement action to 
invalidate a patent is the flipside of a common law infringement action; and (3) policy 
reasons dictate that the issue of patent invalidity be a matter of law necessitating the 
judge rather than the jury determine the underlying fact issues. Id. 
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than legal in nature, and the question of patent invalidity should be 
considered a pure matter of law reserved solely for the court. 
II. Background 
To fully appreciate the Seventh Amendment issues surrounding patent 
invalidity actions, a basic understanding of patent infringement is 
required. Accordingly, a discussion of patent invalidity and declaratory 
judgment follows. 
A. Patent Invalidity 
The Constitution, Article I, Section 8, provides the federal government 
with the authority to enact patent laws.22 Congress has passed many 
such laws which are now codified under Title 35 of the U.S. Code. 
Under the patent laws, the government grants a patent for an invention 
meeting the requirements of patentability as specified in the statutes.23 
The patent grant allows exclusive use of the patented invention by 
patentees or their assigns for a limited period of time in exchange for 
disclosing the invention in full to the public. The patent laws also 
protect established patent rights by specifying infringing activities and 
remedies available in the courts.24 
Traditionally, a patentee sued an alleged infringer for infringement of 
the patent and requested damages or equitable relief. The alleged 
infringer could raise any of four major defenses to the infringement 
claim, including patent invalidity.25 The U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office ("Patent Office") issues a patent when a patent application meets 
three major statutory requirements. First, an invention must fit into one 
of the statutory classes of subject matter allowed for a patent and have 
utility. 26 Second, the invention must be novel27 and it must not be 
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
23. 35 u.s.c. §§ 100-135 (1988). 
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-296 (1988). 
25. The other defenses are inequitable conduct or fraudulent procurement, which 
renders a patent unenforceable, misuse or violation of anti-trust laws, and laches or 
estoppel resulting from delay in filing suit. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 8, § 19.01. 
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("Whoever invents or discovers auy new aud useful 
process, machine, mauufacture, or composition of matter, or·an new useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title."). 
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obvious.28 Finally, the patent application must fully describe the 
invention (description requirement) so that others can make and use it 
(the enablement requirement); set out the best mode known to the 
inventor for carrying out the invention; and have a claim that clearly sets 
out the metes and bounds of the patented invention. 29 
Patents issued by the Patent Office carry a statutory presumption of 
validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 that attaches separately to each claim of 
the patent.30 However, the effect of the presumption is not conclusive 
and a patent's validity can be challenged in the courts.31 To overcome 
the presumption of validity, a patent challenger is required in most 
instances to provide clear and convincing evidence of patent invalidity, 
a higher standard of proof than in other civil actions. 32 
27. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (section 102 sets out seven situations that would negate 
a patent based on lack of novelty.). 
28. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Section 103 provides that although an invention may 
be novel under § 102 of the title, a patent may not be obtained 
Id. 
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious 
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains. 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). Section 112 provides that the specification (i.e. the 
patent application) 
Id. 
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as 
to enable any person skilled in the art to carry . . . out his invention. The 
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out 
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention. 
30. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). While more recent statutory support is provided by 
section 282, the defense of patent invalidity has been around for a very long time. See 
In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
31. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). It provides in pertinent part that: 
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or 
infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: 
1) Noninfringement, absence ofliability for infringement or unenforceability, 
2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in 
part II of this title as a condition for patentability, 
3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any 
requirements of sections 112 or 251 of this title, 
4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title. 
See also Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, 848 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
Under § 282, a patent's validity can be challenged on numerous grounds. See, e.g., 
Gordon T. Arnold, Developing Evidence on Patent Validity Issues 424 PLI/PAT 9 (1995) 
(discussing patent validity evidence relating to prior art and best mode). 
32. North Am. Vaccine v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) ("a patent is presumed valid, and at trial [the plaintiff] had the burden of proving 
facts by clear and convincing evidence showing that the patent is invalid"); but see 
Manufacturing Research Corp. v. Graybar Blee. Co., 679 F.2d 1355 (reversing finding 
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Although the courts acknowledge a public interest in eliminating 
invalid patents, 33 an invalid patent may not be challenged in the court 
on this ground alone. 34 Patent validity may be challenged in federal 
court, however, if raised as a defense to infringement or some other 
claim involving the patent.35 Alternatively, validity may be counter-
claimed in response to a claim for infringement or raised as an entirely 
separate claim for declaratory judgment. 
B. Declaratory Judgment 
Congress passed the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934.36 The act 
authorizes the federal courts to settle the rights and obligations of parties 
to a dispute that has not yet ripened.37 
In the patent field, declaratory judgment actions arise mainly from two 
situations.38 In one situation, invalidity may be charged by a manufac-
turer producing a product that potentially infringes another's patent. In 
the second situation, a licensee may assert invalidity as a defense to a 
licensing dispute.39 
of patent validity for failure to instruct jury on preponderance of evidence standard when 
patent issued without consideration of the relevant prior art). 
33. Blonder Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (emphasizing 
the importance of the public in resolving the question of patent validity). 
34. As the validity of a patent under the patent statute involves a federal question, 
one does not have standing to challenge an invalid patent without a case or controversy. 
See, e.g., Foster v. Halko Mfg., 947 F.2d 469, 479 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The basis for 
maintaining a declaratory judgment for invalidity rests on the existence of a 'case of 
actual controversy,' cognizable in federal court."). 
35. Although invalidity is raised most often as part of an action to patent 
infringement, this defense can also be raised in a variety of other actions involving 
patents, including priority of invention under § 102(g) of the patent statute and patent 
licensing disputes. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 
973 F.3d 911 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding infringement claim not required to resolve 35 
U.S.C. § 102(g) priority issue between parties); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, 508 
U.S. 83 (1967) (regarding a patent licensing dispute). 
36. Declaratory Judgments Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-512, 48 Stat. 955 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1994)). 
37. See generally 6A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
R57 (2nd ed. 1996). 
38. For a discussion of declaratory judgment in the licensee-patentee dispute, see 
Neil M. Goodman, Patent License Standing and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 83 
'COLUM. L. REV. 186 (1983). 
39. Id 
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Declaratory judgment is particularly useful to a potential infringer 
because prior to the Declaratory Judgments Act, a manufacturer was not 
able to test his or her rights and potential liabilities in court until the 
patentee decided to bring suit. Thus, a potential infringer was at great 
disadvantage because the patentee could wait to sue when significant 
damages had accrued to the manufacturer.40 
To bring an action for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an actual case or controversy 
according to Article III of the U.S. Constitution.41 A case or contro-
versy may exist for declaratory judgment without the manufacturer 
actually having infringed a patent. 42 The courts have devised a two-
part test to determine if a controversy exists to sustain a declaratory 
judgment action.43 First, the declaratory judgment plaintiff must have 
a reasonable suspicion that his/her activities will be considered infringing 
and result in a lawsuit. Second, the plaintiff must also show that he/she 
is engaged in, or has the ability to engage in, such infringing acts.44 
Thus, the flexibility of the case or controversy threshold standard for 
justiciability of patent validity under a declaratory judgment action 
provides a powerful weapon to the potential infringing manufacturer. 
The value of the declaratory judgment, which enables a potential 
infringer to test the scope and validity of a patent prior to making 
40. See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) ("Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic [delaying suit] were 
rendered helpless .... "); see also Lawrence M. Sung, Intellectual Property Protection 
or Protectionism? Declaratory Judgement Use by Patent Owners Against Prospective 
In/ringers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 252 nn.70-72 (1992) [hereinafter Sung]. 
41. The statutory language of the Declaratory Judgments Act "case of actual 
controversy," 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1988) is interpreted by the Supreme Court as 
essentially the same as the case or controversy clause of Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) ("The 
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having 
adverse legal interests." (citations omitted)); see also Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 
F.2d 469, 479 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that without a claim of infringement "no suit 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act could be maintained because, as the Supreme Court 
has said, the Declaratory Judgment Act gives no independent ·basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction in district court") (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 
667, 671 (1950)). Although a private individual in the absence of a claim or controversy 
has no standing to challenge the validity of a patent in the courts, anyone, including the 
patentee or his or her assigns, may request the U.S. Patent Office to reexamine the 
validity of a patent based on prior art generally not considered when the patent first 
issued. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988) (Request for Reexamination). 
42. See, e.g., Sung, supra note 40, at 12. · 
43. Id. at 11. 
44. See Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d at 479; see also Sung, supra note 40, 
at 252-56 nn.74-94. 
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significant investments, easily explains why declaratory judgments are 
now routinely used in federal courts.45 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN LOCKWOOD AND IN 
SGS-THOMSON 
The case of In re Lockwood arose when the patentee (Lockwood) sued 
American Airlines for infringement of Lockwood's patents covering self-
service terminals and automatic dispensing systems.46 Lockwood 
sought damages and injunctive relief, and filed a timely request for jury 
trial.47 American Airlines raised several defenses including patent 
invalidity; the company also counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of 
noninfringement and, alternatively, that the Lockwood patents either 
were invalid or unenforceable.48 
After discovery, American moved for summary judgment based on 
noninfringement of the Lockwood claims. The district court granted the 
motion, dismissed Lockwood's infringement claim, and denied 
Lockwood an interlocutory appeal from the judgment. The district court 
(in the absence of a jury) then proceeded to hear American's counter-
claim for patent invalidity based on a recent Supreme Court decision49 
holding that infringement and declaratory judgment actions are both to 
be heard in the same trial. 
Lockwood subsequently filed a motion to obtain a jury trial in the 
invalidity action. The district court denied the motion because it 
considered the remaining claims equitable in nature.50 Lockwood 
petitioned the Federal Circuit under a writ of mandamus directing the 
district court to reinstate his jury demand.51 A three-judge panel of the 
45. See Donald L. Doemberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the 
Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Question 
Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529,532 n.15 
(1989). 
46. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 968 (1995). 
47. Id. at 968. 
48. Id. 
49. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993) (holding that the 
Federal Circuit must review patent validity even when no basis for infringement is 
found). 
50. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968-69. 
51. Id. 
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Federal Circuit granted the writ, providing grounds for the constitutional 
standoff with Judge Nies's dissent.52 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to American Airlines and 
vacated the Federal Circuit decision without comment.53 The Court's 
decision to vacate the Federal Circuit judgement most likely stemmed 
from Lockwood's withdrawal of his demand for a jury trial,54 which 
would render a decision on the issue of a jury trial moot and, therefore, 
not justiciable in federal court. 
A petition for writ of mandamus for a jury trial also arose in In re 
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc., 55 although the procedural action 
in that case differed from that in Lockwood. In SGS-Thomson, 
International Rectifier Corp. (IRC) sued SGS-Thomson Microelectronics 
Inc. (SGS-Thomson) for patent infringement. IRC, instead of seeking 
money damages in its complaint, sought only the equitable remedy of 
injunctive relief.56 SGS-Thomson asserted its defenses and counter-
claimed for declaratory judgments of noninfringment, invalidity, and 
unenforceability. The declaratory judgment plaintiff, SGS-Thomson, 
demanded a jury trial on the counterclaims, which IRC moved to strike. 
The district court denied the motion for a jury trial and SGS-Thomson, 
like Lockwood, filed a request for mandamus to the Federal Circuit. A 
three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit heard the case and decided to 
grant the writ for the jury trial.57 IRC's argument did not persuade the 
Federal Circuit panel that a jury trial right is controlled by whether the 
patentee sues first on equitable or legal claims. The court granted the 
mandamus based on the decision in Lockwood and on the Supreme 
Court's holding in Dairy Queen v. Wood. 58 
52. The mandamus was first issued by the Federal Circuit under the reasoning that 
damages and defenses of the infringement action still remained. This reasoning was later 
abandoned after the Federal Circuit granted a rehearing to American. Id. at 969 ("We 
no longer rely on the misstatements of our previous order."). Judge Nies dissented with 
Judges Plager and Archer in response to a denial for a rehearing en bane of the 
mandamus writ. Id. at 980. 
53. American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995). 
54. Petitioner's Brief, American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995) 
(No. 94-1660); Respondent's Reply Brief, American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. 
Ct. 29 (1995) (No. 94-1660). 
55. 60 F.3d 839, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
56. Id. at 839. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 840 (following the Lockwood court, which based its decision on the 
"legal nature of the declaratory judgment action, not the nature of the patentee's claim"). 
The Federal Circuit in SGS-Thomson refused, however, to grant SGS-Thomson's request 
for a jury trial on the equitable count of patent unenforceability (i.e. inequitable conduct 
on the Patent Office). Id. (citing Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962) 
("claims that are legal in nature and thus entitle the parties to a trial by jury may not be 
treated as subservient to a claim for an injunction so as to deprive a party of its right to 
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As in Lockwood, Judge Nies in SGS-Thomson dissented to the denial 
of an en bane rehearing.59 The Supreme Court finally denied certiorari 
to hear IRC's demand regarding the jury trial mandamus.60 
Several issues are raised by the Federal Circuit majority and en bane 
rehearing dissents in Lockwood and in SGS-Thomson, concerning a right 
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. First, does the Seventh 
Amendment guarantee a right to a jury for a claim of patent invalidity 
when the only dispute between the parties is equitable in nature, as in 
SGS-Thomson? Second, is patent invalidity historically an equitable 
rather than a legal claim, thus falling outside the protection of the 
Seventh Amendment? Third, is the limited monopoly that arises from 
a patent a public right that should require exemption from the Seventh 
Amendment? Finally, is patent validity a matter of law to be decided 
solely by the court? These questions are addressed below in Sections IV 
and V. This Comment concludes that a Seventh Amendment right 
should not attach to an action for patent invalidity because the action is 
more equitable than legal in nature and because the action is a pure 
matter of law. 
IV. SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND APPLICATION TO 
PATENT RIGHTS 
A. Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence 
Although the right to a jury in civil trials had been discussed at the 
Constitutional Convention, the original articles of the U.S. Constitution 
enacted in 1787 failed to include a provision preserving this right.61 
However, popular sentiment for preserving a jury right in civil actions 
prompted the first Congress to pass an amendment to the Constitution, 
ratified as the Seventh Amendment with the Bill of Rights in 1791. 
a jury on the issues involved in the legal claims")). 
59. In re SGS-Thomson, 61 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting). 
60. International Rectifier Corp. v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc., 116 S.Ct. 
336 (1995). 
61. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 n.2, 342 nn.6, 7 
(1979) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (providing a short history of the Seventh Amendment); 
Rachael E. Schwartz, "Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines": An 
Alternative Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J., 599, 
604-11 [hereinafter Schwartz]. 
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The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a trial by jury in 
"[s]uits at common law."62 The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
reference to common law in the Seventh Amendment as the English 
common law as it existed in 1791. 63 This interpretation of the Seventh 
Amendment necessarily requires a historical inquiry into English 
common law actions of 1791 to resolve a question of Seventh Amend-
ment applicability. The courts later expanded the interpretation to 
include any action_that is analogous to "[s]uits at common law" in 1791, 
excluding actions that would have been tried in courts of equity or 
admiralty. 64 The courts further broadened the Seventh Amendment to 
apply to new statutory causes of action unknown in 1791, provided the 
statute creates "legal rights and remedies" enforceable in a court of 
law.65 
The right to a jury trial in civil cases historically required that a 
litigant bring his or her legal claims to a court of law. 66 If a litigant, 
however, had both legal and equitable claims, the equitable claims could 
not be pursued in a court of law.67 To somewhat mitigate this dilem-
ma, the courts devised the "equitable clean-up doctrine," which allowed 
a court in equity to hear equitable claims and any legal claims consid-
ered subordinate to the equitable claims.68 The clean-up doctrine did 
not provide a right to a jury for the subordinate legal claims but did 
provide some relief from the wastefulness of pursuing separate claims in 
separate courts.69 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VIL The amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court 
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Id. 
63. See, e.g., Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) ("[T]o ascertain the 
scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate 
rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional 
provision in 1791." (citations omitted)); John E. Sanchez, Jury Trials in Hybrid and 
Non-Hybrid Actions: The Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine in the Guise of Inseparability 
and Other Analytical Problems, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 639 nn.71-72 [hereinafter 
Sanchez]. 
64. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (citing Parson v. Bedford, 2 
U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 436-37 (1830)); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). 
65. See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to 
actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute 
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary 
courts of law."). 
66. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 38.13 (3d ed. 
1996). 
67. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 63, at 641 n.83. 
68. Id. at 641 nn.85-86. 
69. Id. 
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After the merger of equity and law in the 1930s,70 the question of 
whether an action involved primarily equitable or legal issues and 
required a right to a jury trial became more complex. In many federal 
courts, the right to a jury turned on whether the "basic nature of the 
claim" as a whole was equitable or legal.71 If the claim was basically 
legal in nature, all legal issues would be heard first by a jury and the 
equitable issues would follow later.72 However, if the nature of the 
claim was mainly equitable, the court could apply the equitable clean-up 
doctrine and review both equitable and any legal issues considered 
incidental to equitable claims in the absence of a jury. Thus, in the 
post-merger period, the right to a jury trial was often lost if the legal 
claims were considered incidental to the overall equitable action.73 
The Supreme Court, in Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover,74 essential-
ly eliminated the equitable clean-up doctrine. Beacon Theatres required 
that, in virtually all cases involving both equitable and legal claims, if 
a jury is requested for the legal claims, then all issues common to both 
the legal and equitable claims must be tried first to a jury.75 Thus, 
after Beacon Theatres, inquiry into the nature of the issues rather than 
the nature of the claims controlled the jury trial question. Shortly after 
Beacon Theatres, the Supreme Court, in Dairy Queen v. Wood, extended 
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury for legal issues that previously 
would have been considered incidental to the equitable issues in the 
case.76 
The decision upholding a jury trial right in Beacon Theatres, which 
involved a declaratory judgement action, indicates that the right to a jury 
trial is not lost when the claim is set forth in the form of a declaratory 
70. See, e.g., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a), which provides that a plaintiff 
"may join either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, 
or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party." 
71. See Sanchez, supra note 63, at 642 nn.90-93 and accompanying text; see also 
9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2312 n.11 (1993). 
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
74. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
15. Id. at 504. 
76. Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 n.8 (1962) ("It would make no 
difference if the equitable cause clearly outweighed the legal cause so that the basic 
issue of the case taken as a whole is equitable. As long as any legal cause is involved 
the jury rights it creates control."). 
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judgment.77 Declaratory judgment, being an action unknown at 
common law, is considered sui generis, having neither a legal nor 
equitable character of its own.78 A declaratory judgment thus is viewed 
as either legal or equitable based on the nature of the underlying 
action.79 The procedural step of filing a declaratory judgment for an 
equitable action prior to filing legal counterclaims does not eliminate the 
Seventh Amendment right to have a jury decide the legal claims. 80 
B. Jury Trial Rights as Determined Under the Seventh Amendment 
Historical Test 
Having provided in Beacon Theatres and in Dairy Queen that the 
Seventh Amendment required the right to have a jury hear the legal 
issues prior to the equitable issues, the next and more difficult question 
for the Supreme Court involved whether a particular issue was legal 
within the meaning of "[s]uits at common law" under the Seventh 
Amendment.81 In Ross v. Bernhard, the Supreme Court described three 
factors for determining if an issue is legal or equitable in nature. 82 
First, whether the cause of action is analogous to actions at law or equity 
prior to merger of the two courts; second, the nature of the remedy as 
legal or equitable; and third, the "practical abilities and limitations of 
juries" in hearing the issue. 83 The first and second Ross factors later 
77. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 504 (holding that a defendant who 
counterclaims for damages cannot be deprived of the right to a jury because the plaintiff 
sued first for declaratory relief under an equitable cause of action). 
78. See, e.g., EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGEMENTS 26-28, 239 (2d ed. 
1941) (stating an action for "declaratory relief is Sui generis and is as much legal as 
equitable"); Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) ("The fact that the action is in 
form a declaratory judgment case should not obscure the essentially legal nature of the 
action."). 
79. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Because the 
declaratory judgment action is itself neither legal nor equitable, the historical inquiry 
required by the Seventh Amendment takes as its object the nature of the underlying 
controversy."). Judge Nies's dissent in Lockwood took no issue with the majority view 
that a declaratory judgment is as equitable or as legal as the underlying claims. Id. at 
981. 
80. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 504. 
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
82. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). 
83. Id. The third Ross factor dealing with "practical abilities and limitations of 
juries" raises the issue that a court may potentially deny the Seventh Amendment right 
if the legal issues were too complex for the average juror to handle. Id. The Supreme 
Court in Dairy Queen v. Wood, which involved an accounting for profits in a contract 
and Trademark infringement dispute, considered whether the legal issues were beyond 
the jury's ability. 369 U.S. 469, 479 n.17 (1962). The Court decided that the case was 
not too complex and that a special master, under rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, was an option for the court to help the jury with complex legal issues. Id. 
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became what is known as the Seventh Amendment historical test. 84 
The Supreme Court first applied the Seventh Amendment historical 
test in Curtis v. Loether,85 an action arising under section 812 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968. Section 812 authorizes private plaintiffs to 
redress violations of Title VIII, the fair housing provision of the Civil 
Rights Act. In applying the Seventh Amendment historical test, the 
Curtis Court held the action was legal rather than equitable because it 
was analogous to a tort action (first factor) and the relief sought, actual 
and punitive damages, was "the traditional form of relief offered in the 
courts of law" (second factor). 86 The Court further determined that the 
relief sought was a more important factor than the nature of the action 
in deciding to apply the Seventh Amendment. 87 
In Tull v. United States,88 an action involving civil penalties and 
injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court, using 
the historical test, identified an analogous action in both law and 
equity. 89 Although admitting that the equity action may have been the 
better analogy, the Court held that, as long as the legal action was 
appropriately analogous, the Seventh Amendment applied.90 The Court 
in Tull also reiterated the view from Curtis that the nature of the relief 
sought is a more important factor than the nature of the action. The 
Court concluded that the relief available under the Clean Water Act was 
more typical of an action at law than at equity.91 Thus, applying the 
Seventh Amendment historical test, the Tull Court concluded that the 
Seventh Amendment applied to the adjudication of rights under the 
Clean Water Act.92 
at 478 n.19. In later cases, the Supreme Court seems to have played down the third 
Ross factor or merged its meaning with the public rights exception to the Seventh 
Amendment. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989). 
84. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 n.6 (1987) ("Our search is for a single 
historical analog, taking into consideration the nature of the cause of action and the 
remedy as two important factors."). 
85. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
86. Id. at 196. 
87. Id. 
88. 481 U.S. at 412. 
89. Id. at 420. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 421-25 (noting that damages under the act were not limited to restoration 
of the status quo). 
92. Id. However, the court concluded that the assessment of penalties by a judge, 
as required under the Clean Water Act, was outside the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 427. 
1801 
More recently, the Supreme Court applied the Seventh Amendment 
historical test in Granfinanciera v. Nordberg,93 an action involving a 
Chapter 11 trustee suing in bankruptcy court to block allegedly 
fraudulent transfers.94 In Granfinanciera, the Court determined that a 
claim. of fraudulent transfer could be brought in either a court of equity 
or a court of law.95 However, the Court determined that the nature of 
the remedy sought, a specified sum. of money, required that the action 
be brought to a court of law.96 Thus, the Court followed the rule that 
the nature of the remedy sought was more important than the analogy to 
the cause of action and upheld a Seventh Amendment right to the trustee 
action. 
In its most recent pronouncement of the Seventh Amendment, 
however, the Supreme Court obscured the two-part nature of the 
historical test by ignoring any reference to the remedy sought. In 
Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., the Court stated the historical 
test as a determination of "whether we are dealing with a cause of action 
that either was tried at law at the time of the Founding or is at least 
analogous to one that was."97 The Court's failure to acknowledge the 
second factor of the historical test does not appear to be significant; no 
dispute was raised about the number of prongs involved and the Court 
cited its version of the test to a prior decision that used both factors. 98 
The recitation of an abridged test by the Markman Court can be 
explained because the issue in the case, whether the court or the jury 
interprets the claims in a patent suit, has no connection with the 
remedies, the second factor of the historical test. Thus, Markman 
provides no real basis to argue that the Supreme Court has changed the 
Seventh Amendment historical test from. that which is consistently 
elaborated by the Court in prior cases. 
In sum.m.ary, the Supreme Court's Seventh Am.endm.ent jurisprudence 
provides a two-part historical test evaluating the cause of action and the 
remedy to determine whether an issue is equitable or legal in nature. 
The Court prefers the second factor, the nature of the remedy sought, 
when performing the historical inquiry.99 It has upheld a right under 
93. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 43. 
96. Id. at 46-47 nn.5, 6. 
97. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 (1995). 
98. Id. at 1389 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987)). 
99. See, e.g., Chauffers v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Granfinanciera, 492 
U.S. at 42; Tull, 481 U.S. at 417; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974). 
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the Seventh Amendment in all cases when the remedy involved 
monetary damages exceeding those normally provided by equity. 100 
Any historical inquiry under the Seventh Amendment is necessarily 
complicated by the fact that the line between law and equity was never 
very clear, 101 and that actions at law in eighteenth century England 
might be too "remote in form and concept that there is no firm basis for 
comparison."102 Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court has 
resisted any suggestions to discard or modify the two-factor inquiry. 103 
Thus, an historical inquiry into patent invalidity requires evaluation of 
both the cause of action and the remedy and, depending on the results, 
either one or both of the inquiries must be legal in nature for the 
Seventh Amendment to apply. 
C. Application of Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence to Patent 
Validity 
To determine whether a Seventh Amendment right applies to the 
action in Lockwood, one must look to 1791 English cornrnon law for an 
analogue of a declaration of patent invalidity. The search is complicat-
ed, however, by the fact that patents have long been a statutory right and 
1791 English patent laws provided for the defense of invalidity in both 
courts of law and courts of equity. 104 A court of law gave the patentee 
the option of seeking damages, while a court of equity gave the patentee 
100. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542; Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18; 
Curlis, 415 U.S. at 194. As further evidence for the controlling nature of the remedy, 
courts of appeal have denied the Seventh Amendment right when the remedy was 
equitable in nature but the cause of action could be analogized to an action at law. See 
Sanchez, supra note 63, at 648 n.126 (employment suits under Title VII can be 
analogized to an action at law, but are considered equitable for Seventh Amendment 
purposes because the remedies sought, including back pay and reinstatement, are 
equitable in nature); see also In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies 
J., dissenting) ( citing circuit cases where a Seventh Amendment right was denied without 
a damage claim remaining to be tried); but see Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-
71 (1990) (distinguishing back pay under Title VII from a request for back pay under 
a breech of union's duty of fair representation). 
101. See Chauffers, 494 U.S. at 577 (citing Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury 
Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 658-59 (1963)). 
102. Id. at 578 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
103. Id. at 558 (Marshall, J., majority); id. at 573 (Brennan J., concurring); id. at 
584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
104. See Martin J. Adelman, En Banc on Claim Construction and Equivalents, 423 
PLIIPAT 767, 774-78 nn.104-115 (1995) [hereinafter Adelman]. 
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the option of seeking an accounting of past use and an injunction against 
future use.105 Thus, a right to a jury for patent invalidity historically 
depended on whether the defense had been pled in law or in equity. 106 
Under the procedural facts in Lockwood, the district court granted 
summary judgment to the defendant, American Airlines, for lack of 
infringement, leaving only a declaration of patent invalidity and 
unenforceability in the case. 107 To decide whether Lockwood deserved 
a right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment for patent invalidity, the 
Lockwood court determined that the only satisfactory historical analogue 
for a declaration of patent validity is an action for infringement at law 
when patent invalidity is pled as an affirmative defense. 108 This 
argument, however, fails to address the fact that the defense of patent 
invalidity was also pled in equity without a jury trial. 109 More impor-
tantly, the declaration of patent invalidity in Lockwood no longer has the 
character of a defense to an action at law because Lockwood's infringe-
ment claim for monetary damages was denied by the court. 110 
The Lockwood court attempted to support its historical analogue by 
stating that a declaration of patent invalidity is merely the inverse of an 
action for infringement with the parties in reverse. 111In characterizing 
patent invalidity as the inverse of a suit for infringement, the court could 
properly hold that a right to a jury trial exists under Beacon Theatres v. 
Westwood. 112 As stated in Judge Nies's dissent, however, a declarato-
ry judgment of no infringement, rather than one for patent invalidity, is 
105. Id. at 782. 
106. Id. at 774-78 nn.104-115 (arguing the Lockwood court was wrong in stating 
categorically that the defense of invalidity is a legal issue because it is legal or equitable 
depending on the context of the proceeding). Cf Markman v. Westwood Instruments, 
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 ("there is no dispute that infringement cases today must be 
tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago."). 
107. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
108. Id. at 974 n.9. 
109. Adelman, supra note 104, at 777-78 (citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 
(1881) ("[I]t is now the constant practice of courts of equity to try without a jury issues 
of fact relating to the title of the patentee, involving questions of [patent validity] .... 
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to try such issues according to its own course of 
practice it too well settled to be shaken."). 
110. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968. 
111. Id. at 975 n.10. 
112. 359 U.S. 500, 504 ("[I]f Beacon would have been entitled to a jury trial ... 
against Fox it cannot be deprived of that right merely because Fox took advantage of the 
availability of declaratory relief to sue Beacon first."); see also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1979) ("If the declaratory judgment 
action does not fit into one of the existing equitable patterns but is essentially an 
inverted law suit [sic]-an action brought by one who would have been a defendant at 
common law-then the parties have a right to a jury."). 
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the flip side to an action for infringement. 113 The former is limited to 
the particular claims of the patent that the patentee asserts are infringed, 
while the latter can be asserted against any claims of the patent. 114 As 
pointed out by Judge Nies, there is no flip side to a declaration of patent 
invalidity; the patentee has no opportunity to sue in court to have a 
patent declared valid. 115 The Supreme Court decision in Cardinal 
Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc. 116 provides further support 
that a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity is not the inverse of an 
infringement action where the defense of invalidity is pled. The 
Cardinal Court distinguished the action of infringement from patent 
invalidity by holding that a court of appeal's finding of no infringement 
does not render moot the review of declaratory judgment of patent 
invalidity. 117 In making its decision, the Cardinal court distinguished 
an affirmative defense of patent invalidity from a declaration of patent 
invalidity. 118 Thus, although a declaration of patent invalidity is a 
common defense in an infringement action, it cannot be properly 
characterized as the inverse of an infringement claim when the 
affirmative defense of patent invalidity is pled and, therefore, is not 
subject to a jury trial right on that basis. 
A better historical analogue for a declaration of patent invalidity may 
be found in the English writ of scire facis, which was available in the 
English Chancery court to render a patent invalid. 119 The Court of 
Chancery had common law jurisdiction but had no power to summon a 
jury, and would often transfer the scire facis cases to the King's Court 
113. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 986 n.12 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 986. As discussed by Judge Nies, the closest action for a patentee to 
have the patent declared valid is a Request for Reexamination to the U.S. Patent Office 
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988). The request is an ex parte administrative 
proceeding limited generally to prior art not considered by the Patent Office during 
examination of the patent application. See, e.g., Emhart Indus. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg., 
3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889, 1890 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
116. 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
117. Id. at 96 ("[A] declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent 
of the patentee's charge of infringement."). 
118. Id. at 93-94 ("An unnecessary ruling on an affirmative defense is not the same 
as the necessary resolution of a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment."). 
119. See, e.g., Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 984-85 (Nies J., dissenting); see also Adelman, 
supra note 104, at 790-91 (dismissing the Lockwood panel Order's argument that a writ 
of scrie f acis was limited to an action for inequitable conduct and supporting that the 
writ was more analogous to an equitable action for patent invalidity that an action at 
law). 
1805 
for a jury to determine any issue of material fact. 120 The jury's 
findings were then returned to the Chancellor who rendered the final 
decision on the patent. A jury trial of the facts under the writ of scire 
facis was not a "matter of right" because the jury findings were no more 
than advisory-"merely to inform the conscience of the court."121 
Thus, the lack of a true jury right urges that the English writ of scire 
facis be considered equitable rather than legal in nature. 
Even assuming arguendo the correctness of the Lockwood court's view 
that when the affirmative defense of patent invalidity pled in an action 
for patent infringement is analogous to an action at law under the 
Seventh Amendment test, the second factor of the historical test, the 
nature of the remedy sought, must still be addressed to decide the jury 
right. The Lockwood court and Judge Nies's dissent disagreed over 
whether one or both factors need to be found legal in nature for a jury 
trial right to apply. The Lockwood court, not surprisingly, maintained 
that only one factor need be satisfied and rested its conclusion on a 
footnote in Tull. 122 The footnote, as argued in Judge Nies's dissent, 
does not support, and even repudiates, the Lockwood court's posi-
tion.123 
Indeed, the Lockwood court misconstrues the analysis in Tull by 
focusing on the rights and ignoring the second prong of the historical 
test, the remedy. If one accepts the view that a declaratory judgment of 
120. See Adelman, supra note 104, at 778-79 (1995). 
121. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting); see Adelman, supra note 104 
at 778-79, 790-91; Goodyear v. Day, 10 F. Cas. 678 (C.C.D.S.C. 1849). In England, the 
Chancellor in equity, when in doubt about the validity of a patent, had.discretion to send 
the parties to law to resolve the question. The results of the validity analysis were not 
binding on the Chancellor. Id. But see Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 975 n.9 (stating that an 
issue of fact for a writ of scrie f acis was determined by jury trial and, therefore, the writ 
was legal in nature). 
122. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972 (stating that a jury trial is required when "either the 
adjudication of legal rights [as found in Tull] ... or, alternatively, the implementation 
of legal remedies [as found in Curtis] ... " are involved) (citations omitted). As 
discussed in Judge Nies's dissent, the Lockwood court based its either/or position on a 
footnote in Tull. Id. at 984 n.6 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
The Government contends that both the cause of action and the remedy must 
be legal in nature before the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches. 
It divides the Clean Water Act action for civil penalties into a cause of action 
and a remedy, and analyzes each component as if the other were irrelevant. 
Thus, the Government proposes that a public nuisance action is the better 
historical analog for the cause of action, and that an action for disgorgement 
is the proper analogy for the remedy. We reject this novel approach. Our 
search is for a single historical analog, taking into consideration the nature of 
the cause of action and the remedy as two important factors. 
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 n.6 (1987) (citation omitted). 
123. Lockwood, F.3d at 984 n.6 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("A reading of the entire Tull 
footnote shows·that the [Supreme] Court rejected the panel's position."). 
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patent validity is an action with a right and a remedy, the only inquiry 
then is the right; there is no discretion for the penalty which is complete 
invalidation of the patent claim. 124 Thus, the relevant question is 
whether the action and the remedy are both required to determine the 
right to a declaration of patent invalidity. 
The Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence requires, as 
discussed above, 125 that both the cause of action and remedy are 
necessary factors in the historical test. Thus, Judge Nies in Lockwood 
was correct in her interpretation of the footnote in Tull. 126 Judge 
Nies's dissent, however, takes the categorical position that both factors 
must be found legal in nature for the jury right to adhere. 127 This view 
does not comport with the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment 
jurisprudence,. as already discussed. 128 The Supreme Court provides 
that the right attaches when the two factors "on balance" support a jury 
trial, but offers little guidance on how to achieve that balance.129 
Thus, the Seventh Amendment historical test requires that both factors 
of the test be performed, but there is no absolute requirement that both 
factors be found legal in nature for the right to apply. 130
The second factor in the historical test does not support a Seventh 
Amendment right for a declaration of patent invalidity. The relief 
sought in Lockwood, i.e. invalidation of the patent, is clearly equitable 
in nature. 131 The remedy for patent invalidity is to render unenforce-
124. Because each claim of the patent is presumed valid, an action for invalidity can 
be limited to all or to only individual claims. Invalidation of claims in a patent suit has 
no impact on the ability of the patentee to assert the remaining valid claims. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 288 (1988). 
125. See supra Part IV.A. 
126. A fair reading of footnote six in Tull indicates the Court viewed the cause of 
action and the remedy not as separate inquiries but rather as two factors of a single 
inquiry. Tull, 481 U.S. at 421. 
127. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("Since the first part of the test 
to determine whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial is negated by this 
English equity action [scire facis], that should end the inquiry."). 
128. See supra Part IV.A. 
129. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989). See also supra Part IV.A. 
130. In Markman, the question of who interprets the meaning of patent claims was 
not an action having a right and a remedy but merely a sub-issue in a patent trial. 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). In contrast, a 
declaration for patent invalidity has a right and remedy like any other action and thus 
is amenable to the two-part Seventh Amendment historical test. 
131. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("The remedy sought in this 
case is not legal and therefore, on this ground alone, no jury trial is required."). 
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able any patent claim so judged and, therefore, is no different from the 
equitable remedy for patent unenforceability, which renders all patent 
claims unenforceable for inequitable conduct on the Patent Office. 132 
The remedy for both of these actions is effectively an injunction against 
the patent. 133 
Prior circuit decisions have not addressed . the nature of patent 
invalidity as equitable or legal, except for Shubin v. United States 
District Court. 134 In Shubin, the defendant-patentee, facing a declara-
tory judgment for patent invalidity and non-infringement, stipulated that 
no actual infringement had occurred and pled only for equitable relief. 
Acknowledging that the sole disputed issue of fact in the case was the 
claim for patent invalidity, the court nevertheless held against the 
defendant-patentee's request for a jury trial and concluded the absence 
of infringement damages left only equitable issues to be decided. 135 
The decision in Shubin is consistent with Judge Nies's position that 
patent invalidity is historically not a legal issue. 136 A right to a jury 
for a declaration of patent invalidity should not turn merely on a 
pleading for damages when such a pleading may have no basis in 
fact. 137 Had the patentee in Shubin pled monetary damages, then 
under Beacon Theatres v. Westover138 the jury trial right would apply. 
However, the jury right extends only to any legal issues and, therefore, 
should not apply to the declaration of patent invalidity under Shubin. 
The decision to grant a jury trial for patent invalidity in In re 
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc., 139 a case decided on the holding 
in Lockwood, is similar ·to Shubin in that the patentee only sought 
equitable relief. The Shubin court decided against a jury trial because 
132. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988); see also supra note 35. 
133. But see Adelman, supra note 104, at 788 (arguing that the case or controversy 
remaining in Lockwood is an action for cancellation of the Lockwood patents). 
134. Shubin v. United States Dist. Ct., 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963). 
135. Id. When characterizing the remaining issues as equitable in nature, the court 
seemed to focus on the defendant-patentee's claim for an injunction without mentioning 
the plaintiff's claim of patent invalidity. This oversight might suggest that the court did 
not consider an action for patent invalidity as a significant Seventh Amendment issue. 
136. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 984-87 (Nies, J., dissenting). The Lockwood court, 
however, maintained that Shubin was distinguishable because the defendant could not 
bring a claim for damages. 50 F.3d at 977 ("[N]o claim for damages could have been 
brought."). The court fails to explain how this is any different from Lockwood, who lost 
his damage claim after the trial court dismissed the infringement claim. 
137. The court of appeals in Shubin upheld the district court decision to deny the 
defendant-patentee's request to amend the pleadings and allege monetary damages of 
infringement solely for the purpose of obtaining a jury trial. Shubin v. United States 
Dist. Ct., 313 F.2d at 250. 
138. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
139. 60 F.3d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
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no money damages for infringement were pied and the only action in the 
case was an injunction, which is an equitable claim. 140 Shubin, 
therefore, should control in SGS-Thomson where only equitable relief 
and no money damages were pled. This conclusion is further supported 
by the analysis above that a Seventh Amendment right should not apply 
to a declaration of patent invalidity, as the historical test indicates 
invalidity is an equitable rather than a legal action. 
In summary, application of the Seventh Amendment historical test to 
a declaration of patent invalidity demonstrates at most a legal basis for 
only the least important factor, the historical analogy. Thus, "on 
balance," the two factors of the historical test indicate that the Seventh 
Amendment does not apply to a declaration of patent invalidity, and the 
grant of mandamus for a jury trial in Lockwood and SGS-Thomson 
appears in error. 
The evaluation of any jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment, 
however, must also consider whether exceptions to the Amendment 
would negate that right. The following section of this article, Part V, 
addresses the public rights exception and the matter of law exception as 
they pertain to patent invalidity. 
V. EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND PATENT 
VALIDITY 
A. The Public Rights Exception 
The public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment embodies the 
power of Congress to transfer actions involving public rights to a 
non-Article III forum where the right to a jury is absent. 141 A "private 
right" was defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Granfinanciera v. 
Nordberg as "the liability of one individual to another under the 
140. Shubin, 313 F.2d at 250. 
141. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989) ("The Seventh 
Amendment protects a litigant's right to a jury trial only if a cause of action is legal in 
nature and it involves a matter of 'private right."'); see also Martin H. Redish & Daniel 
J. LaFave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A 
Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 409 
(1995) ("[I]t is clear that when the dust settles, in most cases Congress possesses 
ultimate authority to deny the jury trial right by transferring adjudication to a non-Article 
III forum.") [hereinafter Redish & LaFave]. 
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law."142 In contrast, a "public right" involves the federal government 
or involves "a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into 
a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency 
resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary."143 
In In re Lockwood, 144 Judge Nies cited to Pantlex v. 
Mossinghojf45 to assert that the Federal Circuit previously held patents 
to be public rights. In Pantlex, the Federal Circuit upheld the constitu-
tionality of the patent statute dealing with reexamination. 146 Under the 
statutes, reexamination of a patent occurs in an administrative 
non-Article III proceeding in the Patent Office. 147 Thus, reexamination 
provides an apparent public right to invalidate a patent in the absence of 
a jury trial right.148 The constitutionality of the reexamination statuto-
ry procedure which denies a jury trial right strongly supports the view 
that a patent is a public rather than a private right. 
Judge Nies also argued that, because patents involve public rights, the 
Lockwood court's decision providing a jury trial right for patent 
invalidity conflicts with Supreme Court precedent holding that a jury 
trial does not adhere to a public rights determination. 149 The public 
rights argument, however, fails because it assumes that Congress or the 
courts are required to remove the Seventh Amendment right from all 
public rights actions. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Granfinanciera gave Congress the 
discretion to take actions involving public rights away from the Seventh 
Amendment by placing them in a non-Article III proceeding. 150 In the 
Patent Statutes, however, Congress did not actually remove invalidity 
proceedings from Article III courts, but simply established statutory 
reexamination of issued patents as a parallel non-Article II proceeding 
142. 492 U.S. at 51 n.8 (quoting Crowell v. Bensen, 285 U.S. 22, 52 (1932)). 
143. Id. at 54 (citing Thomas v Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 
(1985) (Brennan J., concurring)). 
144. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 981 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting). 
145. Pantlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
146. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988). 
147. For a comparison of Article III and Non-Article III courts, see Eric Grant, A 
Revolutionary View of the Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 144, 268 (1996). 
148. See Pantlex, 758 F.2d at 604 ("In contrast with the private rights at issue in 
Northern Pipeline, the grant of a valid patent is primarily a public concern."); see also 
Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 228-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (upholding 
Pantlex). 
149. 50 F.3d at 983. 
150. 492 U.S. 33, 52 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Co., 4 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) ("Congress 'may or may not bring within the 
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper,' matters involving 
public rights.")). 
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rights exception does not presently exempt a Seventh Amendment jury 
trial right from patent invalidity actions. 
B. Matter of Law Exception 
For the majority of circumstances, where an issue is subject to a jury 
trial, the judge decides questions of law pertaining to the issue while any 
facts in dispute that bear upon the question are decided by the jury. 157 
Thus, in principle, a pure question of law does not give rise to a Seventh 
Amendment right. 
The Supreme Court stated in Graham v. John Deere Co.,158 that 
"[ w ]hile the ultimate question of patent validity is one oflaw, the § 103 
condition [i.e. obviousness], ... lends itself to several basic factual 
inquiries."159 The traditional interpretation of that statement would 
require that the factual inquiry of obviousness be decided by the jury if 
facts were in dispute ( or by the judge if the action was equitable), and 
whether the facts met the legal requirement would ultimately be decided 
by the trial judge.160 Judge Nies in In re Lockwood raises the provoca-
tive question of whether there is any constitutional basis for a jury to 
decide the factual issues underlying an ultimate question of law.161 
Judge Nies asserts that, as a matter of policy for "reasoned and uniform" 
decisions, the courts are not precluded by the Seventh Amendment from 
157. See, e.g., Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931) ("In a trial by 
jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial 
for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law." 
(emphasis added)); Structural Rubber Prod. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 207, 233 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (differentiating the standard of review for issues of fact determined by 
the jury or the judge versus the standard of review for legal decisions). 
158. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
159. Id. at 17 (citation omitted) (citing A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. 
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)). The factual inquires that must be answered to 
determine invalidity based on obviousness include "(1) the scope and content of the prior 
art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time when the invention was made; and ( 4) objective 
evidence of nonobviousness." Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 989 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18). 
160. Newell Companies v. Kenney Mfg., 864 F.2d 757, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(summarizing Federal Circuit decisions regarding summary judgment motions and 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for patent invalidity based on obviousness holding 
that no trial right adheres unless there is a dispute in the underlying facts). However, 
Federal Circuit precedent generally supports using a jury to decide a question of law in 
patent invalidity. Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 989 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting). · 
161. 50 F.3d at 989-90 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("I can point to no definitive Supreme 
Court pronouncement respecting a Seventh Amendment right or no right to have a jury 
decide factual issues underlying an issue of law."). 
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taking the factual inquiry underlying patent invalidity from the jury if a 
litigant so requests. 162 
The question raised by Judge Nies was later addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 163 The issue in 
Markman involved whether the construction of patent claims is a matter 
of law "reserved entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh Amend-
ment guarantee that a jury will determine" the factual disputes. 164 
Such disputes often arise over the meaning of particular words used in 
the patent claims. 165 The Markman Court held that construction of the 
patent claims, including any factual questions bearing upon the words 
used in the claims, is strictly a matter of law reserved for the court.166 
The Court decided the matter of law exception by considering two 
major questions: (1) whether the statutory action in question was an 
action at law; and (2) if the action is one at law, whether the trial 
decision at issue is necessary to preserve the common law right of trial 
by jury. 167 The Court answered the first question by using the Seventh 
Amendment historical test. 168 The second question, admittedly diffi-
cult to answer, involved inquiry into: (a) 1791 English law (i.e. the 
historical Seventh Amendment test); (b) existing precedent; (c) the 
relative interpretive skills of judge and jury; and ( d) the statutory policies 
furthered by the decision. 169 This precedential analysis will be referred 
to as the "Markman legal issue test." 
The Markman legal issue test can be applied to the facts in In re 
Lockwood to determine if, as Judge Nies asserts, the facts underlying 
patent invalidity should be a matter solely for the court. The test is 
formulated such that if the action or issue is determined to be equitable 
162. Id. ("[A] litigant has a right to a trial court's decision with findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on the issue of validity."). 
163. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). 
164. Id. at 1387. 
165. Confusion in the meaning of terms can arise because the inventor can be his 
or her own lexicographer and give special meaning to words used in the claim. 
However, the term may not have a meaning repugnant to its general usage. In re Hill, 
161 F.2d 367 (CCPA 1947). 
166. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395. 
167. Id. at 1389. 
168. The formulation of the historical test differed from prior formulations in that 
it lacked the second factor, the nature of the remedy sought. Id. at 1384. The court 
made no mention of this discrepancy and likely ignored the remedy factor since the 
action at issue, patent infringement, was indisputably an issue at law. 
169. Id. at 1390, 1392 n.10. 
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in nature under the historical test, there is no jury question issue. If so, 
the second question-whether the action or issue is essential to preserve 
the jury trial right-becomes moot. As discussed above in Part I.A., the 
Seventh Amendment historical test indicates that a declaration of patent 
invalidity is an equitable rather than a legal action, thus, there is no right 
to a jury trial. However, if one considers patent invalidity as arguably 
an action at law, then the second question of the Markman legal issue 
test is addressed to determine if a jury factual inquiry is necessary to 
preserve the substance of the common law right. 
The second question of the Markman legal issue test also begins with 
an historical inquiry, but this time the question is whether the right to 
have a jury for the issue in question is "fundamental, as inherent in and 
of the essence of the system of trial by jury."17° For a declaration of 
patent invalidity, it cannot be argued that a right to have a jury find the 
facts in dispute is historically fundamental because under 1791 English 
patent law, invalidity was a defense raised in both the courts of law and 
equity. 171 The Chancellor in equity had the authority to rule on 
validity but had discretion to refer the case to a jury in the common law 
courts and consider the jury's conclusion only as advisory. 172 
The next factor, whether the existing precedent supports the essential 
right of a jury trial to patent invalidity, is again complicated by the split 
between equity and law. Prior to the merger, a patentee seeking 
equitable relief was required to sue in equity and had no Seventh 
Amendment right to a defense of patent invalidity. 173 
After the merger of law and equity, the courts continued to deny jury 
trial rights for patent invalidity when the action sought was primarily 
equitable. 174 After the Supreme Court decisions in Beacon Theatres 
v. Westwood Inc. 175 and in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 176 it became clear 
that the issues common to both legal and equitable causes must be tried 
first to a jury if requested. But Shubin v. United States District 
Court, 177 a case interpreted in view of Dairy Queen, held that no 
170. Id. at 1390 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426). 
171. See Adelman, supra note 104. 
172. See id. See also supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text. 
173. See Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 133-34 (1881) ("[l]t is now the constant 
practice of courts of equity to try without a jury issues of fact relating to the title of the 
patentee, involving questions of [patent validity] . . . . The jurisdiction of a court in 
equity to try such issues according to its own course of practice it too well settled to be 
shaken."). 
174. See also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
175. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
176. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
177. Shubin v. United States Dist. Ct., 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963). But see In re 
Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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Seventh Amendment right applied to an action for a declaration of patent 
invalidity in the absence of a standing claim for damages. Thus, 
although the most recent precedent seems to require that patent invalidity 
is an action where the Seventh Amendment applies, the weight of 
authority does not support the view that a declaration of patent invalidity 
is fundamental to the system of trial by jury. 
The relative interpretive skills of judge andjury were key factors in 
the decision by the Supreme Court in Markman to take the responsibility 
of claim interpretation from the jury.178 Judge Nies and others contin-
ue to assert that juries are not competent for trying patent issues. 179 
The Markman Court appreciated the need for expert testimony to enable 
proper construction of patent claims in the context of the patent 
document, and the Court concluded that credibility judgments of 
competing experts-a duty best handled by the jury-was less important 
in this instance than the ability to evaluate the testimony of the experts 
in association with the patent document. 180 
The difficulty faced by juries interpreting a patent and its supporting 
documents for claim construction also applies to patent invalidity. For 
example, one must understand the differences between the invention and 
the prior art to determine if the invention as a whole is obvious. This 
analysis requires careful consideration of expert testimony and analysis 
of the art in question. Thus, a strong case can be made that a judge, 
typically well-educated and experienced in document analysis, is better 
equipped than a jury to find the facts underlying patent invalidity. 
The final factor in the Markman legal issue test, the statutory policies 
furthered, was also important to the decision in that case. The Court 
determined that a policy for uniformity in patents was an important 
public issue and that this policy would be ill-served if construction of 
patents and claims were left to'juries. 181 The Court reasoned that the 
singular nature of the Federal Circuit as the sole patent appeals court 
promotes, in theory, some degree of intra-jurisdictional uniformity by 
stare decisis. 182 This logic, however, applies to any questions of law 
and would therefore apply to patent invalidity as well. 
178. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996). 
179. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 996, 990 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting); see also 
supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text; Adelman, supra note 104, at 795. 
180. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395. 
181. Id. at 1396. 
182. Id. 
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In summary, application of the Markman legal issue test, on balance, 
supports a conclusion that the question of patent invalidity should be 
considered solely a matter of law, where the facts at issue and the 
application of the facts to the law are a matter entirely reserved for the 
court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The quest to establish more uniformity and predictability in patent 
decisions by eliminating juries from the decision making process raises 
the issue whether the Seventh Amendment stands in the way of 
eliminating juries from patent invalidity actions. Under Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, patent invalidity is arguably more equitable 
than legal and, therefore, a right to a jury should not attach. Also, under 
the Markman legal issue test, patent invalidity is, on balance, not 
essential to the common law right of trial by jury in patent actions. The 
public policy for uniformity in patent law supports finding patent 
invalidity as a matter of law, reserved entirely for the trial court. 
Finally, by virtue of the fact that patents are public rights, Congress has 
the power to remove all patent invalidity determinations to the Patent 
Office with Federal Circuit review. As the positions in this Comment 
are probably in the minority in the Federal Circuit, patent invalidity will 
continue to command a Seventh Amendment right in the foreseeable 
future, unless the Supreme Court or Congress intervenes on behalf of 
social policy considerations. 
BARRY S. WILSON 
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